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PRIORITY THEORY AND UTILITY THEORY 
L. G. VARGAS 
Joseph M. Katz Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, U.S.A. 
Abstract-The first axiom of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) states that the pairwise comparison 
judgments are reciprocal. Here we explore the relationships between the reciprocal property and preference 
relations with and without the axiom of transitivity and point out some important distinctions between 
utility theory and the AHP. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Until very recently, it was believed that transitivity of preferences was essential for constructing 
value functions that truly represented the preferences of decision makers. The theories of expected 
utility and subjective expected utility, which have dominated decision making under uncertainty 
[l] are deeply rooted in such beliefs. Both theories are normative, i.e. they provide decision makers 
with guides to “consistent and rational” decision making. Bell and Farquhar [2] write: 
“Utility theory is a branch of decision analysis that is concerned with building models 
to explain and guide choice behavior under uncertainty.. .” 
Although the theories fail to predict certain phenomena known as choice paradoxes, they have 
provided a framework to study choice. Recent alternative theories, such as Kahneman and Tversky’s 
prospect theory [3], Chew and MacCrimmon’s ratio model [4], Machina’s generalized utility 
model [S] and Fishburn’s skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility theory [6], do explain some of 
these paradoxes. Fishburn’s theory [7] relaxes both the axiom of transitivity and the axiom of 
independence. It appears to be the most general characterization of utility theory to date. 
There is a basic distinction between these theories and the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). 
The former quantify the intensity of preferences through probability distributions. For example, 
SSB utility theory is based on the existence of a functional @(p, q) defined on the Cartesian product 
of a nonempty convex set of countably additive probability measures (A) defined on the a-algebra 
(0) of subsets of the space of consequences of decisions (9’). They are used mainly to determine the 
attitude of decision makers toward monetary values. The function Q&q) when defined on the 
singletons {x} of 3, i.e. @(x, y), is interpreted as the intensity of preference of consequence x over 
consequence y. It is defined as follows: 
Q((x, y) > 0 if x is more preferred than y, 
Q((x, y) < 0 if y is more preferred than x, 
@(x, y) = 0 if x is equally preferred to y. 
It is also assumed that @(y, x) = -0(x, y). 
On the other hand, in the AHP @(x, y) is defined on the set of consequences. No probability 
measures are involved. 0(x, y) is defined as follows: 
@(x, y) > 1 if x is more preferred than y, 
Q(x, y) < 1 if y is more preferred than x, 
@(x, y) = 1 if x is equally preferred to y. 
It is also assumed that @(y,x) = l/@(x, y). Both the AHP and SSB utility theory do not require 
transitivity to hold. This implies that transitivity is not a necessary condition for representing the 
preferences of decision makers. However, the AHP goes several steps further than all utility theories. 
First, it deals with pairwise comparisons providing a method to elicit judgments of individuals and 
synthesize them into priorities that represent the relative attractiveness of the consequences 
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according criteria. Second, it is a group decision-making methodology. Judgments of individuals 
can be all fused into a single judgment through compromises or through the geometric mean 
criterion (see AczCl and Saaty [8]). Third, it can deal with several levels of complexity. Fourth, it 
is a true measurement theory in the sense that when there are scales associated with the consequences, 
the AHP can reproduce known results. 
On the other hand, utility theories can only be used for individual decision makers and cannot 
be used to estimate numerical values from existing scales. Also, they cannot deal with more than 
two levels of complexity. 
In the AHP transitivity is not required, only the reciprocal property relation, @(y, x) = l/@(x, y), 
Vx, y. This means that if x is preferred to y k times, then y is preferred to x l/k times, so that x 
would be equally preferred to itself, i.e. @(x,x) = 1, Vx. The reciprocal property, which is weaker 
than cardinal consistency and holds between pairs of elements, enables us to study cardinal 
consistency. To be cardinally consistent means that if x is preferred to y z times, and y is preferred 
to z fl times, then x is preferred to z 7 times and y = afi. Cardinal consistency implies ordinal 
consistency (transitivity) but not the converse [9,p. 1911. Thus, it is possible to be cardinally 
inconsistent but still transitive. 
It has been possible to derive conditions under which reciprocal paired comparisons give rise to 
consistency and to indicate when, though as a set they are inconsistent, they can still be thought 
of as permissible. 
The question is: Given a set of behavioral preference axioms between pairs of alternatives needed 
in the logic of traditional decision theory-reflexivity and strong completeness-is it possible to 
assign numerical intensities to the comparisons and do these intensities satisfy the reciprocal 
property? 
One consequence of this approach is that by adopting a fundamental scale with the reciprocal 
property one can obtain a derived scale of measurements which belongs to a ratio scale [9]. 
Another result is that this approach allows one to determine from the binary comparisons the 
degree of inconsistency in the numerical comparisons among all the alternatives without imposing 
transitivity or consistency itself. 
2. MEASUREMENT OF PREFERENCE INTENSITY WITH TRANSITIVITY 
Let A be a finite set of alternatives and let Q) be a set of criteria, properties or attributes by 
means of which binary relations are constructed. Let ac, C E @ be a binary relation on A. Given 
Ai, Aje A, Ai ac Aj represents that Ai is more preferred (or dominates) or equally preferred to Aj 
according to C E C. Let A, - c Aj denote that Ai is equally preferred to Aj according to C E @. 
Axiom 1 (Strong Completeness). For Ai, Aj~ A, Ai ac Aj or Aj a0 Ai. 
We will write Ai -c Aj if Ai > c Aj and A, > c Ai. 
Axiom 2 (Reflexivity). Ai 3 c Ai, VA, E A. 
The general approach given here subsumes the special case of preference relations that are 
strongly complete quasi orders. A strongly complete quasi order is equivalent to the above two 
axioms together with transitivity. We begin by introducing this special case and prove the existence 
of a mapping Pc: A x A + iw+ and show that it is reciprocal and order preserving. We then drop 
the transitivity requirement from the special case and prove the existence of P, in general. 
Definition 1 
Relation ac is a transitive binary relation on A. iff VAi, Aj and A, E A, Ai ac Aj and Aj ac A, 
imply Ai >,c A,. 
Definition 2 
Relation ac is a quasi order on A iff it is reflexive (Axiom 2), and transitive, 
Dejinition 3 
A mapping PC: A x A -+ IL?+ is said to be consistent iff P,(A,, Aj)’ P,(A,, Ak) = P,(Ai, Ak), VA,, 
Aj, A, E A. 
Priority theory and utility theory 383 
Definition 4 
A mapping PC: A x A -+ Iw+ is said to be order preserving iff 
Ai BcAj”P,(A,,Aj) ~ l. 
Theorem 1 
If ac is a strongly complete quasi order on A, then there is a real-valued order-preserving 
function PC on A x A such that 
Pc(Ai, Aj) ’ PdAj, Ak) = PdAi, AA, VAi, Aj, A, E A. 
Proof. To prove this theorem we use the following lemma [lo]: 
“Let A be a complete ordered set whose quotient A/we is countable. There exists 
on A a real, order preserving function, continuous in any natural 
In our case, A is a finite set and therefore, the quotient is countable. 
function g: A x A + Iw+ such that 
Ai 2cAj iff g(Ai) B g(Aj), VA,, Aje A. 
topology.” 
Thus, there exists a real 
Let Pc(Ai, Aj) f g(AJ/g(Aj), VA,, AjE A. By construction PC is consistent and the result follows. q 
From Theorem 1 it can be easily seen that consistency is a more restrictive property than 
transitivity. If PC is consistent then the binary relation ac must be transitive. However, the converse 
is not always true. For example, if P,-(A,, Aj) 2 1, PJA,, A,) > 1 and P,(A,, A,) 2 1, VAi, Aj, Ak~ A, 
then we have Ai 2 c Aj, Aj >c A, and Ai >c A,, VAi, Aj, A, E A. However, one could have P,(Ai, 
Aj).Pc(Aj, A,) # P,-(A,, A,), for some Ai, Aj and A,, and then PC would not be a consistent function 
and ac is still transitive. 
3. MEASUREMENT OF PREFERENCE INTENSITY WITHOUT TRANSITIVITY 
Let A be a countable set of alternatives. 
Lemma 1 
If ac satisfies Axioms 1 and 2 on A, then there exists a real-valued function PC: A x A + lR+ 
such that: 
(1) Pc(Ai, Ai) = 1, VAiEA; 
(2) If Ai 2c Aj,.then P,(Aj, Ai) < Pc(Ai, A,), Ai, AJE A; 
(3) If PJAi, Aj) 2 Pc(A,, A/J, then Pc(Aj, Ai) < Pc_-(A,, Ah) Ai, Aj, A,, ALE A. 
Proof. Select all pairs (Ai, Aj) E A x A such that Ai 2 c Aj. Define PC as follows: 
P,(Ai, Ai) = aE R+, VAi E A, 
Pd A i 3 Aj) = 
aij > a, ifAi2,Aj and Ai”cAj 
(aijE lR+) 
aij = a, if Ai mC Aj. 
There is no loss in generality if a is made equal to unity. 
Let X+ E {aij > 1, aij = P&A,, Aj), Ai, Aje A}. (X’, 2) is a completely ordered set. Hence, given 
aij and ahk in X+, either aij 2 ahk or ahk 2 aij. Assume that aij 2 ahk. For the remaining pairs (Aj, Ai) 
for which Ai >c Aj, define PC as follows: 
PJAj, Ai) = aji < aij, P&A,, A,,) = akh Q ahk; 
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and 
aji 6 akh if aij 3 ahk. 
By construction, Pc satisfies conditions (l)-(3) of Lemma 1. 0 
Let X- = {aji < 1, aji = P,(Aj,Ai), Ai,AjeAj. Let X = (uij = P,-(Ai,Aj), Ai,Aj~A}. We have, 
x = x+ u x- u (1). 
Theorem 2 
If ac satisfies Axioms 1 and 2 on A, there exists a real-valued function f: X -+ X such that 
fCf(aij)l = aij. 
Proof. From Lemma 1, if aij 2 ahk, then aji 6 akh. Also, the cardinality of X+ and X- is the 
same. Hence, there exists a bijective mapping f: X + X such that: 
(1) x 3 x’ iff f(x) d f(x’), x, x’ E X; 
(2) f(1) = 1. 
We now prove by induction that there does not exist an x E X for which f[f(x)] # x. 
Let n be the cardinality of A. For n = 2, we have X = {l,a,,,a,,}. By Axiom 1, either A, ar 
A, or A, acAl. Assume that A, ?scA, and A, mcA,. By definition, Pc(A,,A,) = a,, > 1. It is 
clear that u2i < 1. Thus, we have a,, 2 azl. If f(aia) = u2i, then f(azl) = a12. If f(azl) # ui2, 
either f(aZ1) = azl or f(azl) = 1. Since by definition azl < 1, we have f(a*i) = u2i .f(x) = x iff 
x = 1, and hence we have alI = 1. This contradicts the assumption that a2 1 < 1. Thus, for n = 2, 
fCfc41 = x3 VXEX. (1) 
Assume that equation (1) holds for n = k. We show that it also holds for n = k + 1. Without loss 
ofgenerality,leta,,,+, > aZ,k+l > . . . > uk,k+l andletf(ai,k+I) = ak+l,iri = 1,2,...,k,Bydefinition, 
we have 
ak+l,l < uk+l,2 < . . . < ak+l.k < 1. 
Assume that equation (1) does not hold for some i. We have 
f( uk+ 1.i) # ui,k+ 1 
and 
f( ak+llhh = uh.k+13 forh # i. 
Let j be such that f(ak + r,i) = aj,k+ 1. Let i < j (the same argument may be applied for i > j). We 
havef(ak+l,j) = ai.k+l. Since ai,k+l > aj,k+l for i <i, thenf(ai,k+d <ftaj,k+l) and ak+l,i > (Ik+l.j. 
This contradicts the assumption that ak+l,i < ak+ I,j, Vi cj, and the result follows. 3 
Let IF be the family of bijective mappings from X c_ Rf to X G lR+ such that: 
(1) x > x’ iff f(x) < f(x’), x, x’ E X; 
(2) f(l) = 1; 
(3) f[f(x)] = X,VXEX S [w+. 
Theorem 3 
A necessary and sufficient condition for f~ IF to be the reciprocal property is that f be a solution 
to Cauchy’s generalized equation f(xy) = f(x)f(y). 
Proof. Let fE ff and f(xy) = f(x)f(y), Vx, y E X. The solution to this equation is given by f(x) = x’. 
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Since f~ IF, we have f[f(x”} = xa2 and tx2 = 1. Also f~ F *u = - 1, and the result follows. 0 
Thus to obtain the reciprocal property from the set of axioms one must assume that there exists 
an isomorphism f defined in the set of numerical intensities of the pairwise comparisons X and 
that it is a solution of Cauchy’s generalized equation 
f(XY) = fW(Y). 
Axioms 1 and 2 are consequences of the reciprocal property if it is given as an axiom. If it is 
not assumed then it cannot be derived from preference axioms. 
REFERENCES 
1. H. J. Einhorn and R. M. Hogarth, Decision making under ambiguity. J. Business 59 (4), Part 2, 225~250 (1986). 
2. D. E. Bell and P. H. Farquhar, Perspectives on utility theory. Opns Res. 34, 179-183 (1986). 
3. D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47, 263-291 (1979). 
4. S. H. Chew and K. R. MacCrimmon, Alpha-nu choice theory: generalization of expected utility theory. Working Paper 
No. 669, Univ. of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C. (1979). 
5. M. J. Machina, Expected utility analysis without the independence axiom. Econometrica SO, 277-323 (1982). 
6. P. C. Fishburn, Non-transitive measurable utility. J. math. Psychol. 26, 31-67 (1982). 
7. P. C. Fishburn, SSB utility theory: an economic perspective. Maths sot. Sci. 8, 63-94 (1984). 
8. J. Acztl and T. L. Saaty, Procedures for synthesizing ratio judgments. J. math. Psycho/. 27, 93-102 (1983). 
9. T. L. Saaty, The Analytic Hierarchy Process. McGraw-Hill, New York (1980). 
10. G. Debreu, Representation of preference ordering by a numerical function. In Decision Process (Edited by R. M. Thrall, 
C. H. Coombs and R. L. Davis), pp. 159-165. Wiley, New York (1954). 
